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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 257 
Accident time: 08:32 Accident Date: 24/05/1999 
Where it occurred: Plowshare minefield, 
Cordon Sanitaire 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: KMS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
request for long handtool (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in two-man teams using a one-
man drill. One deminer looked for tripwires, cut undergrowth, used the detector and 
excavated finds while the other watched from a safe distance and "controlled" him. The group 
issued frontal protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while 
excavating. 
1 
An internal Accident report was made available by the demining group in December 1999. 
The following summarises its content. 
The victim was wearing his protective equipment correctly and excavating a detector signal 
using excavation drill when a "suspected R2M2" detonated at 08:32. 
The victim was "treated on the spot" by the medic and doctor (who was present on site), then 
taken to the field medical unit and from there to Karanda hospital accompanied by the doctor. 
The site ambulance was 50 metres from the accident site when it happened. 
Because the doctor was no longer on site, work stopped "and the remaining mines were 
destroyed". 
A site investigation was carried out immediately. The victim's detector was found to be 
switched on and "functioning". His prodder was 60cm from the excavation and undamaged. A 
"part of" his trowel was found 20 metres away in another cleared area. His visor was visible 
two metres away in an uncleared area and the head-frame was visibly broken. His water-
bottle used for softening the ground was 1.5 metres away from the accident site. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was carrying out an excavation drill correctly. A 
high "gravel" content in the soil made excavation the correct drill to use. His blast apron was 
covered with mud, which was taken as proof that he was using water to soften the ground. 
The investigators thought it likely that the mine was unusually sensitive due to having spent 
"more than 20 years in the ground". They thought it possible that the spring firing mechanism 
was already partly depressed. 
The investigators decided that the victim was saved from "more serious injury due to the fact 
that he was wearing the PPE correctly". 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that a period of re-training be started concentrating on 
"signal investigation" and "prodding/excavating drills". Deminers must be instructed not to 
continue uncovering any mine that appears to be damaged. The investigators also called for 
"more research and development of excavation tools". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 331 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 2 hours 38 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 







See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief field "Medical Injury report" was made available in December 1999. It stated that the 
victim arrived at Karanda hospital at 11:10 having been taken by road (using two vehicles). 
The victim had sustained: 
"near total amputation (L) Mid, 4,5, fingers; deep laceration (L) hypthenar eminence. Surgical 
amputation (L) minimi digit with preservation of 4, mid finger". 
The report ended by stating that the victim was recovering in hospital with the medical 
"outcome still to be determined". 
A medical report dated 28th September 1999 was also made available in December 1999. It 
stated that the victim was injured in a "grenade blast" and had suffered amputation of his "left 
little finger". Marked "stiffness" in the "remaining ulnar two fingers" was noticed and 
physiotherapy and continued dressing recommended. An "X" ray of the hand revealed "an 
impacted fracture of the proximal phalanx of the left ring finger. 
The patient was later assessed by a specialist who noted "very stiff proximal inter phalangeal 
joint of the middle finger...and... very stiff joint of the distal inter phalangeal joint and proximal 
inter phalangeal joint of the ring finger". The specialist concluded, "I do not think that one can 
get any functional movement of these very stiff joints which are frozen and also the mal union 
can be ignored because correcting by an osteotomy will only appear nice on the x-ray but 
functionally useless". 
The doctor concluded that the victim could no longer work as a deminer. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because the victim appears to 
have been working properly in accordance with his SOPs when the accident occurred. The 
damage to his hand was almost certainly a consequence of using an inappropriate tool. The 
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
However, the management of this group is to be applauded for having recognised that the 
tool was a contributory factor and identifying a need to change. This self-critical willingness to 
change is rare. Many groups use an excavating trowel of even less appropriate design than 
that used in this accident. 
 
A picture of one of the group's excavation trowels after an accident is shown above. This 
example did not break entirely in two. 
Although the use of tools like this (when straight) is easy – it is difficult to use them at the 




In January 2000 the researcher was told that the victim had been re-employed after 
recovering from a finger amputation. The visor that the victim had been wearing is shown 
below. 
  
The visor was marked with a short cut (circled in the photograph) that penetrated the 5mm 
polycarbonate fully at its central point. The cut  was made by the edge of the victim's trowel 
and the force required to cut the visor implies that the victim's face would have been severely 
injured if the visor had not been in place. (The visor had been written on and was used in 
training as a warning to deminers to keep the visor down.) 
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